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INTRODUCTION

The law's delay was one of the considerations that prompted
Hamlet to ponder the ultimate question of whether "[tjo be or not
to be." I The solicitors ofJarndyce andJarndyce,2 on the other hand,
took a more sanguine view and parlayed it into long and lucrative
careers spanning several generations. With an attitude somewhere
between the brooding contemplation of Hamlet and the benign
acceptance of theJarndyce solicitors, modern day utility regulators,
managers, and customers continue to wrestle with the law's delay
in the form of regulatory lag.
A great number of proposals have been advanced in an attempt
to mitigate the adverse effects of regulatory lag. Two of these
have, to varying degrees, received general acceptance in the regut Mr. De Long received his J.D. degree from the University of Denver College of
Law in 1969. He is presently a Hearing Examiner for the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings specializing in rate setting and regulation of public utilities, motor carriers, and mail carriers.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, scene i, line 55.
2. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, ch. 1 (London 1887).
473
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latory community. The first is interim rates, a method whereby
the utility is either authorized to implement higher rates, or compelled to implement lower rates, pending final determination of
permanent rates by the jurisdictional regulatory body.1 The second proposal, widely accepted in a restricted form, is the cost adjustment clause. Such a clause allows a utility to either increase or
decrease its rates in accordance with fluctuations in current operating costs specified in the clause. The intent of these proposals is
to both reduce the lag common to modern rate cases and to mitigate the revenue loss to the utility during the lag period. It is
ironic that interim rates, which mitigate only revenue loss during
the lag period and consequently increase the period of lag by reducing the incentive for expediting rate proceedings, have received
general acceptance in the regulatory community, while the adjustment clause, which can reduce both the lag period and the revenue loss attendant thereon, has received only a grudging
acceptance and has historically been restricted primarily to the re4
covery of fuel costs.

While the need to reduce regulatory lag is primarily a financial
one, the legal problems to which it gives rise are rooted in the constitutional principles governing due process and the taking of private property for public use. This article traces the development
of the application of those principles, first to the public utility concept in general, and second, to the specific issues of interim rates
and cost adjustment clauses. Special emphasis is placed upon public utility regulation in Minnesota and the relative merits of interim rates and adjustment clauses as utilized in Minnesota.
II.

THE PUBLIC UTILITY CONCEPT

Although modern regulatory bodies look almost exclusively to
the statutes of their respective jurisdictions to determine the scope
of their authority, the public utility concept was born in the English common law several centuries before the technological development of the industries typically governed by modern public
utilities statutes. 5 Notwithstanding these tremendous technological
3. "Permanent rates" is a term of art meaning rates approved by the appropriate
regulatory body upon conclusion of hearings on a utility's request for increased rates. In
times of persistent inflation the phrase is not synonymous with longevity.
4. See in2fta note 88.
5. The Minnesota Public Utilities Act, effective January 1, 1975, restricts the legal
definition of a public utility to certain retail sellers of natural, manufactured, and mixed
gas and electric service. MINN. STAT. § 216.02 (1982). Telephone companies are not le-
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differences, the modern statutes have been expressly upheld on the
basis of common law principles.
In 1876, the year Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone and six years before the first electric generating station was
put into commercial operation in this country, 6 the United States
Supreme Court decided five companion cases, known as the
Granger cases.' These cases upheld a series of state statutes establishing maximum rates for the storage and carriage of agricultural
commodities and passengers by privately owned grain elevators,
warehouses, and railroads. In the most famous of these cases, Munn
v. Ilh'nois,8 the Court upheld the conviction of the owners of a
grain elevator located on the Chicago harbor for failing to comply
with an Illinois statute establishing maximum storage rates for
grain. The owners appealed the conviction on the ground that the
statute constituted an unconstitutional exercise of power by the
state, including the taking of private property for a public use
without just compensation. The Court held the statute constitutional and stated, "It [the statute] established no new principle in
the law, but only gives a new effect to an old one." 9 The old principles the Court found to be given new effect by the statute were
those discussed by Lord Chief Justice Hale of the King's Bench of
England approximately two hundred years earlier in his legal trea0 The Court cited with approval the followtise De Porlibus Mart's. l
ing principle from Lord Hale's essay:
If the king or subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their
goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the king, . . . or because there is no other wharf in

that port, as it may fall out when the port is newly erected; in
gaily defined as public utilities but have been regulated on a statewide basis since 1915.
1915 Minn. Gen. Laws ch. 152 (current version at MINN. STAT. ch. 237 (1982).
6. The Pearl Street Station in New York City was put into commercial operation on
September 4, 1882, with 59 customers. E. VENNARD, THE ELECTRIC POWER BUSINESS
(1962).
7. The Grange, or Patrons of Husbandry, was a national agricultural society at one
time headquartered in Minnesota. During the last half of the 19th century it successfully
lobbied legislatures in a number of states to adopt statutes regulating charges for the storage and carriage of agriculturally related products. Such legislation was referred to as
"Granger legislation" and the cases litigating the validity of such legislation became
known as the "Cranger cases."
8. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
9. Id. at 134.
10. Hale, DePortibusAaris, in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 45, 78 (F. Hargrave 1787).
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that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties
for cranage, wharfage, pesage, etc., neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the king's license or
charter. For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences
are affected with a public interest and they cease to bejuris
pnvati only. I

The Court found that the appellants' elevator, together with
other elevators on the Chicago harbor, held a "virtual monopoly"
on the grain trade passing between the western grain producing
states and the more populous eastern seaboard. Under these conditions, "Their business most certainly tends to a common charge,
2
and is become a thing of public interest and use.'
Munn was presumably selected as the case in which to discuss
the principles of public regulation because the similarity between
the grain elevators on the Chicago harbor and the wharves on the
English harbors discussed by Chief Justice Hale made the application of existing regulatory principles appear a logical extension of
the common law. In the remaining four cases, the Court applied
those same principles with little further discussion and upheld
state statutes establishing maximum rates for transportation of
freight and passengers by privately owned railroads.' 3 Thus, for
the first time the Court expressly discussed and allowed the application of the public utility concept that privately owned enterprises, particularly those which tend to a monopoly and to which
members of the public must come for service, are subject to public
regulation. 14
III.

REASONABLE RATES VERSUS CONFISCATORY RATES

The Court's concern with reasonable rates in the Granger cases
focused on the need to protect customers of regulated industries
from excessive rates and not the right of those industries to earn a
reasonable return on their capital. This is clear from the language
of Chief Justice Hale to the effect that the duties taken by an own11. 94 U.S. at 127.
12. Id at 131-32.
13. The other Granger cases and the states in which they originated are Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876) (Iowa); Winona & St. P.R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180
(1876) (Minnesota); Peik v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1876) (Wisconsin); and
Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1876) (Wisconsin).
14. For a thorough analysis of the origins of this concept see McAllister, Lord Hale and
Business Affected with a fubc Interest, 43 HARv. L. REV. 759 (1936).
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er of a wharf affected with a public interest must not be "arbitrary
and excessive," but must be "reasonable and moderate."' 5 While
the Court made passing reference in Munn to the idea that the
power of the state to prescribe maximum rates might have constitutional limitations, and that it was a power which might be subject to abuse, it stated that for protection against abuses of the
legislature the people must resort to the polls and not to the
courts. 16

In Peik v. Chicago & North-western Railway,' 7 the Court rejected
the argument that courts must ultimately decide what are reasonable rates and held that rates fixed by the legislature are binding
upon the courts. It once again stated that the only appeal was to
the legislature. Thus was the power of the state to prescribe maximum rates established without the concommitant obligation of the
state to ensure a reasonable return to the regulated industries, and
without providing a judicial remedy for any potential violation of
this power by the state. Ten years later, however, in upholding a
Mississippi statute creating a railroad commission empowered to
established maximum rail rates, the Court recognized by way of
dictum that the power to regulate is not the power to destroy. A
state cannot, under the pretense of regulation, do that which
''amounts to a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, or without due process of law."' 8 The Mississippi commission, however, had not yet established any rates and
the Court was not directly confronted with this constitutional
issue.
In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota ,'9 a challenge to legislation creating the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission, the Court addressed the taking issue. The
Minnesota commission had established maximum rates for the
carriage of milk between points in Minnesota. The Minnesota
Supreme Court had ruled that these rates were not subject to judicial review for reasonableness. 20 The United States Supreme
15. 94 U.S. at 127.
16. Id. at 134.
17. 94 U.S. 164, 178 (1876).
18. Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886). This is one of three
companion cases reported as the Railroad Comm.rsion Cases. The others are Stone v. Illinois
Central R.R., 116 U.S. 347 (1886), and Stone v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R., 116 U.S. 352
(1886).
19. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
20. See State ex re. Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 38
Minn. 281, 37 N.W. 782 (1888).
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Court held that under such an interpretation, which it was bound
to accept, the law denied the railroad due process of law by depriving it of the right to a judicial investigation into the reasonableness
of rates.2 1 The Court ordered dismissal of the mandamus action
brought in the state court to compel the rates established by the
commission.22 Thus, without expressly so stating, the Court reversed in part its holdings in the Granger cases and created a judicial remedy for confiscatory rates established by state laws or
regulatory bodies.
It was soon clearly established that the federal courts had jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of confiscatory rates. 23 Federal
jurisdiction over local rates was strongly resisted by the states,
however, particularly those wherein Granger legislation had been
adopted. 2 4 Congress subsequently removed federal jurisdiction
over state ratemaking orders in those cases in which a remedy is
readily available in the state courts.2 5 Federal courts retain jurisdiction over suits challenging the validity of state regulatory stat26
utes in general.
IV.

CONFISCATORY NATURE OF REGULATORY LAG

Regulatory lag is that period of time between the filing of a rate
case, wherein the utility alleges a revenue deficiency, and the time
when the regulatory commission provides remedial relief in the
form of an order authorizing higher rates.2 7 Orders of regulatory
bodies establishing rates have long been held to be legislative in
nature. They prescribe new rules for future application, as opposed to adjudicating rights and liabilities under existing or past
facts and laws. 28 Such orders have the same force and effect as
21. 134 U.S. at 456-57.
22. Id at 458-59.
23. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 467, 526 (1898).
24. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (Attorney General of Minnesota incarcerated for contempt of federal court order enjoining enforcement of rail rates established by
state's Railroad and Warehouse Commission).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1342(4) (1976).
26. See Minnesota Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 523 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
dented, 424 U.S. 915 (1976) (upholding Minnesota Public Utilities Act).
27. This is the most common scenario in present inflationary times. In the less frequent cases in which the regulatory body orders a rate reduction, regulatory lag adversely
affects the consumers. This has happened at least once in Minnesota since the adoption of
the Public Utilities Act. See Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-76-408
(Minn. P.S.C., Dec. 18, 1976).
28. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
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legislative enactments and are subject to the same restrictions, 29
3
including the prohibition against retroactive application. 0
In addition to canons of statutory interpretation disfavoring retroactive application of legislative enactments, there are also sound
practical reasons for restricting ratemaking orders to prospective
application. The Michigan Supreme Court stated such a reason in
a decision reversing the retroactive application of an order of that
state's commission reducing telephone rates which it had previously approved. The court said, "For the state to prescribe utility
rates, forbid the utility to charge any other rates, and then say that
those rates may be declared unjust and unreasonable as applied to
executed transactions shocks the conscience. Under such a rule
3
how could the utility order its affairs?" '
This same reasoning seems equally valid in the more common
instances in which a commission authorizes increased rates. Utility consumers are also in need of finality in executed transactions
for purposes of ordering their affairs. The prohibition against
retroactive application is well established in both state and federal
jurisdictions. 32 Thus, in the absence of other remedial provisions,
revenues lost to the utility or its consumers during the period of lag
are permanently lost, with no opportunity for future recoupment.
V.

INTERIM RATES

The most direct method of preventing revenue loss to either the
utility or its customers during the period of regulatory lag is
through interim relief, in the form of either higher or lower rates,
pending determination of appropriate permanent rates. The question then arises as to what are, or should be, the guidelines in
fixing interim rates?
In 1923, the United States Supreme Court upheld a provisional
rate increase authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission
even though the increase was based upon evidence insufficient to
29. See State v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 204 Minn. 516, 284 N.W. 294 (1939).
30. See Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 323 U.S. 141,
164 (1944) ("Retroactivity, even where permissible, is not favored, except upon the clearest mandate.").
31. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 315 Mich. 533, 538-39, 24
N.W.2d 200, 206 (1946) (quoting appellee's brief).
32. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 590 F.2d
664 (7th Cir. 1979); State ex reZ Utilities Comm'n v. Farmers Chem. Ass'n, 42 N.C. App.
606, 257 S.E.2d 439 (1979); cf Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. City of Dallas, 591 S.W.2d
609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (commission has power to make rates retroactive to any date
after which it assumes jurisdiction).
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enable the commission to dispose of the issue completely and permanently. 33 After finding that the commission had provided the
parties with the opportunity for a full hearing, the Court held that
the requirements of due process were not violated merely by the
provisional nature of the order nor because further investigation
34
might require a revision of the provisional rates.
While courts generally require a less stringent test for interim
rates than for permanent rates, interim rates are not immune from
the constitutional prohibition against confiscation. In Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Hiton,35 two telephone companies requested
permission from the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission to implement increased interim rates pending the outcome of
the commission's ongoing investigation of existing rates. The commission denied the request for interim relief and the telephone
companies sued in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the order. From the substantial evidence received by the commission in
its investigation, the court found the existing rates confiscatory, as
the telephone companies had alleged. The court enjoined enforcement of the commission order denying interim relief and entered
its own order authorizing such relief. It did not, however, automatically accept the interim rate levels proposed by the telephone
companies, but adopted rates that a dissenting member of the
Minnesota commission had thought authorized by the evidence
received. 36 In commenting upon the nature of temporary rates,
the court quoted approvingly from Love v. Atchison, T &SF Railway,37 decided by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ten years
earlier. "It is as much a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to take the property of the railroad company without just compensation during the process of ratemaking as it is after the completion of that process." 3 8a
Two years later, the United States
Supreme Court also cited Love in upholding a lower court order
enjoining the enforcement of confiscatory interim telephone rates
39
established by the New York commission.
Because the right to be free from confiscatory rates is founded
on constitutional principles, it follows that regulatory bodies have
33. New England Div. Case, 261 U.S. 184 (1923).

34. Id at 195-96.
35. 274 F. 384 (D. Minn. 1921).
36. Id. at 395.

37. 185 F. 321 (8th Cir. 1911).
38. 274 F. at 393.
39. Prendergast v. New York Co., 262 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1923).
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not only the authority but the obligation to authorize adequate
interim rates, even in the absence of statutory provisions expressly
granting such authority. 40 The New Mexico commission has
granted interim relief when it believed such relief warranted by
the circumstances, despite the absence of either express statutory
authority or a request for such relief by the subject utility. 4' This

procedure was subsequently cited with approval by the state's
supreme court.

42

The crucial test in many jurisdictions as to whether or not interim relief should be granted is not the presence or absence of
statutory provisions, but whether or not the circumstances warrant
such relief on a case by case basis. The nature of the evidence
required to establish a justification for such relief, however, varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In at least one jurisdiction, a mere showing that the utility has
failed to meet its authorized rate of return is sufficient to support a
request for interim relief.43 In contrast, the Washington commission, after a review of commission decisions throughout the country, concluded, "An interim rate increase is an extraordinary
remedy and should be granted only where an actual emergency
exists or where necessary to prevent hardship or gross inequity"
and "only where refusal to do so would cause clear jeopardy to the
utility and detriment to its ratepayers and stockholders. '44 It went
on to state that a mere failure by the utility to earn the previously
allowed rate of return is not sufficient to warrant interim relief.45
Any attempt to thoroughly discuss the distinctions between the
various standards employed by the several jurisdictions would only
lead one inextricably into a semantic morass. For instance, the
Michigan commission, although stating that the grant of interim
relief does not require a showing of either emergency or extraordinary conditions, has held that a failure to earn a previously allowed return will not justify interim relief unless it is accompanied
by at least one other hardship condition, such as, inability to ar40. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 90
N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977); Kauai Elec. Div. of Citizens Util. Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 1
(Hawaii P.U.C. 1979).
41. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R.4th 332 (N.M. C.C. 1973).
42. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 N.M. at 331, 563 P.2d at 594.
43. Florida Power Corp., 8 P.U.R.4th 95th (Fla. P.S.C. 1975).
44. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 11
P.U.R.4th 166, 168 (Wash. U. & T.C. 1975).
45. Id at 170-71.
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range debt financing, distinctive and sudden decline in revenues,
or evidence that a failure to grant interim relief will result in irrep46
arable harm to the utility.

A reading of the reported cases tends to corroborate the finding
of the Washington commission that a great number of commissions require a showing of something more than a utility's inability
to earn its authorized rate of return before interim relief will be
granted. Additional evidence is generally required to establish
that the existing revenue deficiency threatens the utility's ability to
meet its public service obligation by reason of an inability to pay
its current operating expenses or to obtain capital funds to construct necessary new and replacement plants. 4 7 At least one jurisdiction requires a showing of such a threatened impairment of the
utility's ability to render service, and will then only grant temporary relief at the minimum level necessary to avert the
48
emergency.
A.

Due Process in Fixing Interim Rates

Implicit in the requirement that a utility establish a need for
interim relief is the requirement for some kind of hearing in which
the evidence of such a need may be tested. The question of what
constitutes due process, or whether due process requires a hearing
before interim relief may be granted, however, is not answered
consistently by the various jurisdictions. For instance, Michigan
has a statutory requirement that a hearing be held prior to the
granting of interim relief.49 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
held that a statute requiring a hearing before fixing utility rates in
general also mandates a hearing to determine interim rates. 50 On
the other hand, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission found no
statutory right to a hearing before a proposed rate increase could
become effective. It held that, "As long as interim rates are placed
into effect subject to refund, they do not violate due process stan46. Detroit Edison Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 113, 118 (Mich. P.S.C. 1974).
47. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 363 (D.C. P.S.C. 1975); KansasNebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 217 Kan. 604, 538 P.2d 702 (1975).
48. Dayton Power & Light Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 136 (Ohio P.U.C. 1980). The Massachusetts Department of Public Service has recently held that interim relief will only be
granted for recovery of costs actually incurred or which are otherwise known and measurable. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 121 (Mass. Dep't P.S. 1980).
49. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 460.62(1) (1982).
50. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 Wis. 274, 293, 287 N.W. 122, 137
(1939).
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dards."5 1 The commission went on to state that most courts that
have considered the issue have rejected the argument that due process requires the complete litigation of every issue before interim
relief can be granted. Such a holding, however, is nothing more
than a necessary recognition of the definitional distinction between interim rates and permanent rates. Holding that interim
rates can be authorized only after full litigation of all the issues
would effectively define interim rates out of existence and render
the entire issue moot.
Even those jurisdictions that require hearings prior to granting
interim relief recognize that such hearings may be more abbreviated than hearings for fixing permanent rates. 5 2 As stated by the
Michigan Court of Appeals in rejecting the argument that the
state commission was without authority to render temporary relief
to prevent the impairment of a utility's ability to serve the public
without having before it an expert-supported analysis of the utility's financial status, "It would be foolhardy navigation to see
whitecaps breaking over a reef which lies on a given course, and
require that course to be maintained without an in-depth study
''53
and report on the advisability of changing it.

Because of the constitutional moorings of the prohibition
against confiscatory rates, including confiscatory temporary rates,
the right to procedural due process to test the reasonableness of
temporary rates should not be dependent on statutory provisions.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized this
principle in a case in which it was confronted with two inconsistent statutes, one requiring a hearing before a change in utility
rates could be implemented and another being silent on the issue.
Rejecting the argument that the silent statute should be interpreted as allowing a rate change without a prior hearing, the court
stated that administrative law originated within "constitutional
perimeters" and no statute could nullify the constitutionally mandated procedural requirement of due process, either by contrary
provisions or by silence. 54 Notwithstanding this constitutionally
mandated requirement for procedural due process, several juris51. Washington Water Power Co., 22 P.U.R.4th 485, 487 (Idaho P.U.C. 1977).
52. Friends of the Earth v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 78 Wis. 2d 388, 402-03, 254 N.W.2d
299, 304 (1977).
53. Attorney General v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 63 Mich. App. 69, 77, 234 N.W.2d
407, 411 (1975).
54. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 S.E.2d 322, 326-27 (W.
Va. 1978).
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dictions have adopted statutory schemes of regulation that allow
utilities to set and implement their own level of interim rates without commission approval after a brief period of prior notice or suspension. Minnesota is one such jurisdiction.
B.

Interim Rates in Minnesota

In Minnesota, public utilities and telephone companies may
place new rates into effect upon sixty days prior notice to the
state's Public Utilities Commission. 55 The commission may suspend such rates for a period of time not to exceed ten months from
the initial filing date. 56 The interim rates are determined by the
commission ex parte without public hearing at the time of this
initial notice of rate change. 57 If the commission does not make a
final determination on permanent rates within ten months from
the initial filing date, the interim rates are deemed approved by
the commission.5 8 The statutes for both utilities and telephone
companies provide that no judicial review is available until the
commission has rendered its final determination, even though the
59
interim rates may be in effect up to ten months.
It is difficult to reconcile the Minnesota regulatory scheme with
the constitutional prohibition against confiscatory rates and the
due process requirements which pervade public utility regulation.
The Minnesota scheme seems particularly ironic in view of the fact
that these principles were, in large part, developed in cases arising
in Minnesota. As seen, one of the original Granger cases upholding
the public utility concept arose in Minnesota,6" as did the cases
wherein it was first held that due process required an opportunity
for judicial review of ratemaking orders, 6 1 including those for tem62
porary rates.
While all of these cases arose out of allegations by regulated industries that existing rates resulted in confiscation of their property
for public use, equal protection would seem to require that utility
55. MINN. STAT. §§ 216B.16(1), 237.075(1) (1982). Chapter 216B governs public
utilities and chapter 237 governs telephone companies.
56. Id §§ 216B.16(2), 237.075(2) (1982).
57. MINN. STAT. §§ 216B.16(1), 237.075(1) (1982) require the notice of rate change to
"state the change proposed to be made in the rates then in force, and the time when the
modified rates will go into effect."
58. Id §§ 216B.16(2), 237.075(2) (1982).

59. Id §§ 216B.16(3), 237.075(3) (1982).
60. See Winona & St. P.R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1876).
61. See Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
62. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Hilton, 274 F. 384 (D. Minn. 1921).
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consumers also be entitled to due process in determining the reasonableness of temporary rates. In Smyth . Ames,63 stockholders of
several railroad companies challenged the constitutionality of a
Nebraska statute fixing maximum rates to be charged by rail carriers, alleging that the rates were confiscatory. In its discussion of
the public duties of railroads, the Court stated that they were created as agencies of the state for a public purpose and that they
perform a function of the state. Accordingly, they cannot set rates
64
solely in their own interest and ignore the rights of the public. It

quoted approvingly from an earlier case, stating, "When the question arises whether the legislature has exceeded its constitutional
power in prescribing rates to be charged by a corporation controlling a public highway, stockholders are not the only persons whose
rights or interests are to be considered. The rights of the public are
'6 5
not to be ignored.
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's holdings in
these cases, several courts have upheld regulatory statutes authorizing interim rates in essentially the same manner as Minnesota's
statutes on the ground that due process does not attach to the
fixing of such rates. In Senior Citziens Clubs of Winston-Salem v. Duke
Power Co. ,66 plaintiffs brought an action under a federal civil rights
statute,67 alleging that a North Carolina statute allowing a utility
to place interim rates into effect under bond after a brief suspension period deprived them of their constitutionally protected right
to due process by denying them a hearing on the reasonableness of
such rates. The court rejected the argument on the ground that
the implementation of interim rates by the utility did not constitute the requisite state action necessary for relief under the civil
rights statute.68 The court relied onJackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co. ,69 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the termination of utility service did not constitute sufficient state action
to require a prior procedural due process hearing. Jackson, however, based its holding on the fact that the utility had terminated
service pursuant to a tariff provision filed with the Pennsylvania
63. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
64. Id at 544.
65. Id at 545, quottng Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164
U.S. 578 (1896).
66. 425 F. Supp. 411 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
68. 425 F. Supp. at 413.
69. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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Public Utilities Commission, but never considered by the commission in any formal proceeding. Accordingly, the commission had
never placed its primatur upon the termination procedure. Such
reasoning does not readily transfer to interim rate provisions contained in a comprehensive statutory scheme 70of regulation enacted
by a state's legislature and signed into law.
A decision more in accord with the holding of Smyth v. Ames,
that the actions of a public regulated enterprise constitute state
action, is Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co. 71 In Zhrke, a consumer
challenged the constitutional validity of the utility's regulations
governing termination of service in the City of St. Paul when that
city still regulated the utility's operations within its boundaries.
The action was brought under the same federal civil rights statute
as was Senr'or Citziens Clubs. The district court held that the utility
would not be acting under color of law in terminating service and
dismissed the action. The appellate court reversed, finding that
the utility's action of termination would be under color of law because the city had granted the utility an exclusive franchise and
had reserved the power to extensively regulate the utility's opera72
tions within the city.
In Sellers v. Iowa Power & Light Co. ,73 an Iowa statute allowing

interim rates in a manner similar to that in Minnesota was upheld
against a charge that it deprived consumers of their right to a due
process hearing. The court, however, did not base its holding on
the issue of state action. It stated that utility consumers have no
constitutionally protected property rights in existing rates and are
therefore not entitled to a procedural due process hearing prior to
the implementation of interim rates. 74 Again, this decision does
not readily square with the holding in Smyth v. Ames that rates cannot be fixed solely in the interests of the regulated industry. The
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that regulatory
bodies have an obligation to balance the interests of the regulated
utility and its consumers. 75 Accordingly, lower court holdings that
70. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (municipal
utility required to provide due process hearing before terminating service).
71. 459 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1972).
72. Id at 570; see also Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
73. 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
74. Id at 1174-75.
75. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/11

14

De Long: Due Process Requirements of Interim Rates and Cost Adjustment Cla
1982)

INTERIM RATES AND COST ADJUSTAIENT CLAUSES

consumers have no protected interest in any particular level of
rates are perplexing.
At least one federal court has found that the imposition of a late
penalty charge by a utility constituted action under color of law
and that consumers have a right to judicial review to determine
whether such a penalty constituted a confiscatory rate.7 6 The
court held, however, that it was prohibited by federal statute7 7
from making a determination of whether or not the particular
78
charge constituted a confiscatory rate.
Another federal court held that a consumer's right to electric
service is a constitutionally protected right under the doctrine of
"entitlement. ' 79 The "entitlement" concept, as developed by the
United States Supreme Court, holds that rights provided to persons by statute, even though not originally constitutionally protected rights, become such important interests that they cannot be
taken away without due process merely by labeling the interest a
"privilege" rather than a "right." 8 0 In Minnesota, where a comprehensive system of regulation has been adopted to provide retail
consumers of natural gas and electric service with reliable service
at reasonable rates, 81 and which provides that "[a]ny doubt as to
reasonableness should be resolved in favor of the consumer, ' '82 a
strong argument can certainly be made that the right to utility
service at a reasonable rate is an "entitlement" of utility consumers
that cannot be taken away, even temporarily, through the implementation of new rates without a due process hearing.
In both Sellers and Senior Citizens Clubs, the courts were bolstered
in their decisions by the fact that utility customers were protected
by a provision for refund of any portion of the interim rates found
to be unreasonable. Such a provision is also contained in the Minnesota scheme of regulation.8 3 This is a valuable protection to
consumers. The benefits of such a provision, however, are greatly
diluted by the evolving phenomenon of the annual rate case. This
is particularly critical in Minnesota where there are no restrictions
76.
77.
78.
79.
1972).
80.
81.
82.
83.

Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co., 367 F. Supp. 102 (D. Kan. 1973).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
367 F. Supp. at 106.
See Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y.
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
See MINN. STAT. § 216B.01 (1982).
Id. § 216B.03.
See id.§§ 216B.16(3), 237.075(3).
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on when a utility or telephone company may file a new rate case
and thereupon implement interim rates after the prescribed notice
period. 84 Under these conditions, it is possible for a utility to file a
new rate application in lieu of filing new permanent rates pursuant to a commission order in the immediately preceding rate case
and thereby collect unilaterally imposed interim rates for a period
of ten out of every twelve months. While such a filing of new interim rates, in lieu of an approved schedule of permanent rates,
has not yet occurred in Minnesota, it has occurred and been upheld in North Dakota, a state wherein the Public Service Commission has authority to suspend interim rates for a period of eleven
months.8 5 Under such conditions, refund provisions offer only lim86
ited protection to consumers from excessive rates.
In Minnesota, the burdens of regulatory lag have been largely
shifted to consumers through the allowance of interim rates immune from either administrative or judicial review for reasonableness and which have the potential of becoming less temporary
than authorized permanent rates. A strong argument can be
made that through greater utilization of cost adjustment clauses
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission can relieve the consumers of much of this burden without shifting it back to the utili87
ties or telephone companies.
84. Following are the filing dates of notices of change in rates by two
major electric utilities, Minnesota Power and Light Company (MP&L)
States Power Company (NSP), taken from a publication of the Minnesota
Public Service entitled, Utily Filings For Rate Increases, 1975-1980, with a
MP&L
NSP

of Minnesota's
and Northern
Department of
1981 update.

Feb. 18, 1976
Jan. 2, 1975
April 5, 1977
May 3, 1976
April 10, 1978
May 20, 1977
Feb. 1, 1980
May 1, 1980
May 1, 1981
July 1, 1981
85. See O'Connor v. Northern States Power Co., 308 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1981). In
O'Connor, the commission approved a permanent rate schedule for the utility on April 26,
1977. The utility filed new interim rates in lieu thereof on May 12, 1977. Pursuant to the
statutory notice period, the interim rates became effective on June 11, 1977. The commission refused to exercise its statutory authority to suspend the interim rates. Id. at 367.
86. The Ohio commission, which has discretion in granting interim relief, recently
stated that such relief will not be granted as a substitute for, or in circumvention of, permanent rate relief. Dayton Power & Light Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 136, 140 (Ohio P.U.C.
1980).
87. It is not necessary to assume that interim rates are presently an excessive burden
upon Minnesota ratepayers in order to seek remedies against the potentiality of their becoming so. As the leading spokesman for public utility regulation in the state of Maine
stated in 1913:
'Here is a public utility', they say, 'we are running all right, we are not doing
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VI.

COST ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES

The cost adjustment clause has enjoyed only reluctant acceptance by regulatory bodies. Its general application has been largely
restricted to the recovery of fuel costs, and then only from the large
power users, not the residential and small commercial classes of
utility customers. Historically, such clauses have received their
greatest acceptance during periods of inflation, particularly inflation spurred by war time demands for large quantities of fuel. a8
Two of the earliest fuel adjustment clauses were adopted in the
war year of 1917 by the Illinois and New Hampshire commissions.
The Illinois commission justified the clause on the basis of a then
recent sixteen percent increase in the cost of coal. 9 The New
Hampshire commission relied upon the then present abnormally
high cost of coal. 90
Not all commissions, however, were willing to break new regulatory ground by adopting adjustment clauses for the purpose of accommodating the unprecedented war economy fuel prices. 9' In
Rockford Electric Co. ,92 the same Illinois commission, which less than
one month previously had approved one of the earliest fuel adjustment clauses, rejected a similar proposal for reasons that to this
day remain the primary arguments against such clauses.
The first reason given by the Illinois commission for rejecting
the clause was that state law required all utilities to file schedules
of rates for services to be furnished. 93 The adjustment clause violated this law, the commission held, because by its terms it was
impossible to determine rates until after the service had been furanything wrong, nor we won't do anything wrong, it ought not to be regulated,
not touched upon'. . .. But we believe the commission, should have authority,
if necessary, to do it. Why, you have been out in the woods without a gun ...
You were not likely to meet any wild thing. The chances were against that, that
you wouldn't meet any. But when you want a gun you want it awfully bad. It
may not be necessary in the case of many corporations, to do much with them in
this State. They are doing good business, hones and square. But you want
power. You want authority.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 354 A.2d 753, 759 n.4 (Me. 1976).
88. For a history of fuel adjustment clauses, see Foy, Cost Adjustment in Utility Rate
Schedules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 663 (1960); Trigg, EscalatorClauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 964 (1958); Note, Due tocess Restraints on the Use of Automatic
Adjustment Clauses in Utility Rate Schedules, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 454 (1976).
89. Alton Gas & Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. ANN. 12, 21 (I1l. P.U.C. 1917).
90. Rockingham County Light & Power Co., 1917F P.U.R. ANN. 24, 25 (N.H. P.S.C.
1917).
91. See Alton Gas & Elec. Co., 1917F P.U.R. ANN. 12, 23 annot. (Ill. P.U.C. 1917).
92. 1917F P.U.R. ANN. 196 (I11.P.U.C. 1917).
93. Id. at 198-99.
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nished and the cost of fuel used in providing that service had been
calculated. 94 The objection to fluctuating rates resulting from adjustment clauses has been broadened to include the argument that
such fluctuations would be annoying and confusing to customers,
95
particularly to residential and small commercial customers.
A second reason given in Rockford Electric for rejection of the adjustment clause was that the commission had the statutory obligation to fix reasonable rates and that the operation of the
adjustment clause would constitute an improper delegation of that
authority to the utility.9 6 The commission acknowledged that it
could still investigate the reasonableness of the rate so established,
but concluded that in such an investigation the burden of proof as
to the appropriate level of rates would be improperly shifted from
97
the utility to the commission.
Yet another reason given by the Illinois commission for rejecting
the fuel adjustment clause was the belief that it gave undue weight
to one single item of cost and failed to give adequate attention to
all other operating costs in determining the utility's return. 98 The
underlying concept is that while the costs of fuel may be increasing, these costs might be offset by decreases in other operating
costs. The net effect would be a constant return on equity to the
utility without a need for additional revenue increases. 99 The
commission also feared that allowance of the fuel adjustment
clause would be used as the foundation for expanded adjustment
clauses that would automatically pass through to consumers these
other costs. 100
Finally, the Illinois commission touched upon the issue of procedural due process. Due process has developed into one of the major issues facing modern commissions and courts in dealing with
adjustment clauses. While the Illinois commission did not expressly mention notice and the requirement for hearing, it did
point out that Illinois law provided that no rate increase should be
94. Id at 199.
95. Georgia Power & Light Co., 74 P.U.R.(N.S.) 69, 78 (Ga. P.S.C. 1948); Public
Serv. Gas Co., 1920E P.U.R. ANN. 396, 397 (N.J. Bd. P.U. 1920).
96. 1917F P.U.R. ANN. at 200.
97. Id.; see also Jones v. Montpelier & Barre Light & Power Co., 1921D P.U.R. ANN.
145 (Vt. P.S.C. 1921); Fox v. Pine Grove Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co., 1920B P.U.R.
ANN. 380, 385 (Pa. P.S.C. 1911) (adjustment clause held incompatible with spirit of regulatory statute).
98. 1917F P.U.R. ANN. at 200.
99. See Northwest Natural Gas Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 361 (Or. P.U.C. 1975).
100. 1917F P.U.R. ANN. at 199.
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granted except upon a showing to the commission that such an
increase is justified. The commission interpreted this to mean a
"formal showing" and found that the clause-violated this statutory
requirement because it did not provide for any such "real
showing."' 0 '
While the objections to the adjustment clause raised by the Illinois commission in 1917 still confront modern day utility commissions and courts, 10 2 it has been stated that a majority of the cases
reported between 1917 and 1931 approved fuel adjustment
clauses,10 3 and that in 1960, rate schedules in at least forty states
04
and the District of Columbia contained fuel adjustment clauses.
A.

Due Process Requirementsfor Adjustment Clauses

As in the case of interim rates, the question of what constitutes
adequate procedural due process in the implementation of cost adjustment clauses varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In most
reported cases on the issue, due process requirements are measured
by local statutory requirements for notice and opportunity for
hearing in utility rate cases.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld a comprehensive
adjustment clause, providing for the recovery of salary, wage, depreciation, and other expenses, on the basis of a statute allowing
the commission to negotiate and agree with any utility for an adjustment of rates during the pendency of a rate proceeding. The
commission order had provided that the amounts collected under
the clause would be subject to scrutiny for reasonableness during
the pending rate proceeding and that any amount found to be excessive would be refunded through customer credits. Since the
state statutes governing rate proceedings provided for both notice
to consumers and an opportunity for them to be heard, the court
held that the public's right to due process was adequately protected. 10 5 In short, the New Jersey court treated the comprehensive adjustment clause in largely the same manner as the
Minnesota statutory scheme treats interim rates, with the notable
101. Id at 201.
102. For a recent case rejecting a fuel adjustment clause for virtually identical reasons
as Rockford Elearic, see State cx rel. Utility Consumers Council of Missouri, Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 585 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1979).
103. Note, supra note 88, at 455.
104. Foy, supra note 88, at 669.
105. See In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975) (with
strong dissent in opposition to clause).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 11
492

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

exception that the New Jersey commission retains jurisdiction to
fix the terms of the adjustment clause and, therefore, the amount
of interim relief utilities may collect.
Other jurisdictions tend to treat adjustment clause rate increases
as permanent rate increases. The provisions of such clauses are
measured against the due process requirements of the statutes governing general rate proceedings, and not against statutes governing interim rates. The Vermont Supreme Court has struck
down fuel and purchased power adjustment clauses on the ground
that their failure to provide notice to consumers before every increase occasioned by their operation violated the statutory requirement for thirty days prior notice for every new rate filing. 106 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has similarly held that a comprehensive
adjustment clause, similar to the one upheld by the New Jersey
court, was invalid because the rate increases resulting from its operation would violate a statute requiring hearings to be held before
any change in schedules that constitute an increase in rates may go
into effect. 107
Several jurisdictions have used a less literal definition of "rate
change" in upholding adjustment clauses in the face of statutes
requiring prior notice before any new rate increases may be implemented. In one of the earliest cases in which an adjustment clause
came under judicial review, 08 the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia upheld a purchased gas adjustment clause whereby the
utility passed on to its retail customers the increased costs of its
purchased gas without prior notice to the retail customers, even
though a state statute provided that no change shall be made in
any rate schedule without due notice to the public. The court
stated that rate schedules are not mere lists of rates in dollars and
cents. They also contain provisions for determining rates in the
future and the adjustment clause is merely a fixed rule in the form
of a mathematical formula for making such a determination. Accordingly, "The resulting rates under the escalator clause are as
firmly fixed as if they were stated in terms of money." 10 9 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has likewise held that, so
long as the formula contained in the adjustment clause remains
106. See In re Allied Power & Light Co., 132 Vt. 354, 321 A.2d 7 (1974).
107. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 260
N.W.2d 712 (1978).
108. City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 97 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955).
109. Id at 516, 90 S.E.2d at 148; see also City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 13 11. 2d 607, 150 N.E.2d 776 (1958).
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fixed, no hearings are required for mathematical fluctuation in
rates pursuant to the clause. Due process was afforded to utility
customers under a general statutory provision requiring the state's
Department of Public Service to give notice and conduct a hearing
on the quality or price of gas or electric service, either on its own
motion or upon the filing of a complaint by any twenty customers
of a given utility. The fact that this required some initiative on the
part of consumers did not suggest unfairness." I0
B. Adjustment Clauses in Mi'nnesota
The Minnesota Public Utilities Act allows the Public Utilities
Commission to permit public utilities to file rate schedules containing adjustment clauses."' The Public Utilities Commission
rules also provide for an electric energy adjustment clause" t2 and a
purchase gas adjustment clause.' 13 The electric energy clause all4
lows utilities to pass on to customers costs of purchased power"
and the costs of fossil and nuclear fuel consumed in the generation
of electricity."l 5 The electric energy adjustment is the average cost
of energy purchased and fuel consumed per kilowatt hour during
the current period, defined as the most recent two month moving
average"l6 less the base costs per kilowatt hour.'

7

The adjustment

must be calculated monthly and applied to the billing period succeeding the calculation." 8 The purchase gas adjustment clause requires three separate calculations; a commodity adjustment,' l9 a
demand adjustment,

20

12
and a manufactured gas adjustment.'

All of the adjustments made under these clauses must be imple22
mented and stated on the customer's bill.
The adjustments that result from these clauses may be placed
into effect without prior commission action, subject to two condi110. Consumers Org. For Fair Energy Equality, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 368
Mass. 599, 335 N.E.2d 341 (1975).
111. MINN. STAT. § 216B.16(7) (1982).
112. 13 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. PSC 392 (1982).
113. Id PSC 393.
114. Id.PSC 390(F).
115. Id. PSC 390(G).
116. Id. PSC 390(L).
117. Id PSC 392(B).
118. Id PSC 392(C).

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id PSC
Id PSC
Id PSC
Id.PSC

393(B)(1).
393(B)(2).
393(B)(3).
392(A), PSC 393(A).
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tions. 123 The first condition is that any error in an adjustment in
excess of five percent of the corrected adjustment must be refunded to the customer with interest. 124 A second and more significant condition from the viewpoint of due process allows the
commission, either upon complaint or upon its own motion, to
conduct an investigation pursuant to notice and hearing and, as a
result of such investigation, fix at current levels, discontinue, or
modify any automatic adjustment provision for an individual utility.' 25 Any proposed revision in the electric energy or purchase gas
adjustment clauses is deemed a change in rates and will be reviewed according to commission rules and practices relating to
26
rate changes. 1
Minnesota adjustment clauses provide essentially the same due
127
process protections found adequate by the Massachusetts court,
and certainly greater protections than the Minnesota Public Utilities Act provides in the allowance of interim rates. The question
remains whether or not these same protections could be built into
an expanded and more comprehensive adjustment clause allowing
utilities and telephone companies to recover other legitimate operating costs relatively contemporaneously with the incurrence
thereof so as to reduce the need for frequent and extended rate
case hearings.
C

Fuel Adjustment Clauses Versus Comprehensive Adjustment Clauses

Cost adjustment clauses drafted to specify precisely what costs
may be recovered pursuant to their provisions are strictly procedural in nature. By far the vast majority of adjustment clauses
dealt with in the reported cases provide for the recovery of the
types of costs which are normally allowed as utility operating costs.
Very few such cases turn on the issue of whether or not the costs
attempted to be recovered should be allowed to the utility as legitimate operating costs. 12 8 Therefore, reasoning that accepts the fuel
123. Id. PSC 394(C).
124. Id PSC 394(D).
125. Id PSC 34(E). MINN. STAT. § 216B. 17 (1982) provides that the commission shall
investigate the rates and regulations upon its own motion or on complaint of any political
subdivision, the Department of Public Service, another utility or 50 customers of a particular utility. Accordingly, the rules applicable to the adjustment clauses provide greater
protection than the statute by not fixing a minimum number of customers who may initiate an investigation through the complaint procedure.
126. 13 MINN. CODE AGENcY R. PSC 395(C) (1982).
127. See supra note II and accompanying text.
128. For cases denying adjustment clauses designed to recover utility company contri-
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adjustment clause, but denies the more comprehensive clause
designed to recover costs of salaries, wages, taxes, supplies, and
equipment, is strained at best.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court displayed a certain discomfort in
making such a distinction without a difference in denying a comprehensive adjustment clause in Wisconsin Environmental Decade, Inc.
v. Pub/ic Service Commission .129 In the body of its opinion, the court
discussed the history of fuel adjustment clauses and pointed out
that they have been used by Wisconsin utilities since 1918. It then
pointed out that the validity of the fuel adjustment clause was not
at issue in the case at hand. In a final footnote, the court pointed
out that the comprehensive adjustment clause that it had just
struck down included aspects typical of the more traditional fuel
adjustment clauses. The court took pains to reiterate that the validity of those fuel adjustment clauses was not at issue in the case.
It then went on to state that the comprehensive clause under consideration was invalid because of its additional elements.130 The
court never attempted to explain why the comprehensive adjustment clause requires due process hearings and the fuel adjustment
131
clause does not.
The objection raised continuously since Rockford Electric-that
single costs should not be considered in isolation, but must be considered in the context of the utility's overall costs-is no more valid
as to those costs contained in the comprehensive clauses than it is
to fuel costs. In fact, in jurisdictions such as Minnesota, where the
regulatory commission reserves jurisdiction to review the cost adjustments and requires a filing of the data underlying such adjustments,1 32 a strong argument can be made that the more
comprehensive the adjustment clause the more information the
commission will have at its disposal for determining whether some
butions to the Gas Research Institute because said contributions were found not to be in
the best interests of consumers, see Western Slope Gas Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 93 (Colo. P.U.C.
1979); Intermountain Gas Co., 27 P.U.R.4th 281 (Idaho P.U.C. 1978).
129. 81 Wis. 2d 344, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978).
130. Id. at 352 n.4, 260 N.W.2d at 716 n.4.
131. In a subsequent rate case, Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 268 (Wis.
P.S.C. 1980), the commission stated that the fuel adjustment clause has performed satisfactorily during this decade in enhancing the opportunity for the utility to recover just
and reasonable operating costs, thereby minimizing overall capital costs. Id at 278.
132. See 13 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. PSC 394 (1978). This rule requires all utilities to
file annually their procurement policies for selecting sources of fuel and energy purchased,
their dispatching policies, a summary of actions taken to minimize costs, and a summary
of the computation of each adjustment.
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cost reductions may offset other cost increases and result in no
need for additional or overall revenue increases to the utility.
Another argument against the adjustment clause is that its automatic allowance of the recovery of increased costs will reduce the
utility's incentive to minimize such costs. It is argued that if the
utility can automatically pass these increased costs on to its customers it will not make any great efforts to engage in hard bargaining in procuring the essential labor, supplies, and equipment
at costs favorable to its customers. It is recognized by proponents
of this argument that some costs, such as fuel, purchased power,
purchased gas, and taxes are, to varying degrees, beyond the control of the utility and are therefore more appropriately allowed to
be automatically passed on to customers. Nevertheless, the argument retains its persuasiveness in many jurisdictions.
One method of ensuring a continuation of a utility's incentive to
keep its operating costs at a minimum is to allow it to recover only
a portion of an increase in its operating costs through the adjustment clause. In Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. ,133 the South Dakota

commission was confronted with a classic case containing all of the
elements which would seem to justify such a procedure. In that
case, the utility's fuel supplier was its wholly owned coal mining
subsidiary. On the basis of this relationship, the commission staff
argued that the price paid for coal by the utility was not a reasonable standard and urged that the utility be allowed to recover only
75% of its increased coal costs through its fuel adjustment
clause.1 34 The commission accepted the argument in principle but
allowed the utility to recover 90% of such costs.

35

In a proceeding

in which such an affiliated interest was not present, the California
commission ordered a 98% recovery of increased fuel costs in order
to ensure the utilities' incentive for hard bargaining in procurement of fuel.1 36 Applying a provision similar to that in Minnesota,
it also required the utilities to which the energy clauses were to be
applied to file all fuel procurement contracts, solicitations, bids,
and offers with reasons for rejecting any bids, solicitations, and
37

offers. 1

The Minnesota commission does not place any restrictions on
133. 21 P.U.R.4th 1 (S.D. P.U.C. 1977).
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id
136. Energy Cost Adjustment Clauses, 31 P.U.R.4th 81, 86 (Cal. P.U.C. 1980).
137. Id. at 87-88.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/11

24

De Long: Due Process Requirements of Interim Rates and Cost Adjustment Cla
19821

INTERIM RATES AND COST ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES

the percentage of actual incurred cost increases utilities may recover through electric energy and purchase gas adjustment clauses.
Nevertheless, through continuing and diligent monitoring of the
utilities' procurement policies, consumers should be well protected
against any lack of hard bargaining by the utilities.
If the commission were to allow the recovery of additional costs
through an expanded adjustment clause structured essentially the
same as the present electric energy and purchase gas clauses, it
might be necessary to require implementation of the adjustments
on something less frequent than a monthly basis and to require
implementation of all cost adjustments on fixed but staggered
dates for each utility or telephone company. Since the Public Utilities Act and the telephone statute provide a sixty day lag for the
recovery of cost increases, it would seem reasonable to allow the
implementation of cost adjustments pursuant to a comprehensive
adjustment clause at sixty day intervals. By staggering the implementation dates for the various utilities and telephone companies
under its jurisdiction, the commission could structure a schedule
for reviewing the periodic adjustments and would not be inundated with monthly cost adjustments. 3 8 By providing a sixty day

lag period within which the utility or telephone company would
be required to absorb any cost increases, the utility would have a
continuing incentive to keep cost increases as low as possible under
present inflationary conditions.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The provisions for interim rates in Minnesota provide substantially less due process protection to the consumers than does the
allowance for the recovery of costs by the utilities through the electric energy and purchase gas adjustment clauses, inasmuch as the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission retains jurisdiction to investigate and modify these latter adjustments. It is clear that the
automatic recovery of electric energy and purchase power costs
through the adjustment clause has not reduced the need for frequent rate changes by Minnesota utilities. This is obviously due to
parallel increases in other costs of operations presently recoverable
only through the mechanism of a general rate case. In order to
prevent the loss of recovery of these cost increases during the pe138. The California commission provides for a triannual adjustment and has staggered
the implementation dates of the four utilities subject to the energy cost adjustment clause.
Id. at 86-87.
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riod of regulatory lag attendant upon a rate case, the utilities and
telephone companies must recover them through interim rates in a
manner provided by law. By means of a properly constructed
comprehensive adjustment clause, the frequency of new rate case
filings could be reduced by allowing utilities and telephone companies to recover significant and non-controversial operating costs,
yet affording consumers an opportunity to timely challenge any
cost adjustment made pursuant to the provisions of such a clause.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/11

26

